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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the problem of secret
key agreement in state-dependent 3-receiver broadcast channels.
In the proposed model, there are two legitimate receivers, an
eavesdropper and a transmitter where the channel state infor-
mation is non-causally available at the transmitter. We consider
two setups. In the first setup, the transmitter tries to agree on
a common key with the legitimate receivers while keeping it
concealed from the eavesdropper. Simultaneously, the transmitter
agrees on a private key with each of the legitimate receivers that
needs to be kept secret from the other legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper. For this setup, we derive inner and outer bounds
on the secret key capacity region. In the second setup, we assume
that a backward public channel is available among the receivers
and the transmitter. Each legitimate receiver wishes to share a
private key with the transmitter. For this setup, an inner bound
on the private key capacity region is found. Furthermore, the
capacity region of the secret key in the state-dependent wiretap
channel can be deduced from our inner and outer bounds.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1949, Shannon introduced a perfect secrecy condition in
a system with an eavesdropper [1]. The system is considered
to be perfectly secure if H(K) ≥ H(M), where H(K)
and H(M) are the entropies of the message and the key,
respectively. In order to share keys in a network, common
randomness is required to be distributed among legitimate
users. Common randomness can be achieved through corre-
lated sources or channel distribution, which categorizes secret
key agreement into two different models; Source model and
Channel model. The problem of secret key agreement in the
source model was first studied by Ahlswede and Csiszar [2].
They considered a network with two legitimate users and
an eavesdropper. The legitimate users, which are connected
together via an insecure noiseless channel, intend to agree
on a secret key while observing correlated sources. In a
noisy channel, common randomness can be obtained using
the channel distribution. This model is not beneficial for secret
key sharing if the legitimate users do not have any advantages
compared to the illegal users. Maurer solved this problem
using a backward public channel in the wiretap model [3].
In [4], Gohari and Anantharam studied the channel model
for a multiple terminals network at which legitimate terminals
and an eavesdropper are all connected to an interactive public
channel. In addition, the terminals have access to a noisy M-
receiver broadcast channel. The legitimate terminals agree on
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a common key using received messages from the M-receiver
broadcast channel and the public channel. Instead of using the
public channel, correlated sources can be utilized in the chan-
nel model. Khisti et al. established this idea for key agreement
over a wiretap channel where the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver have access to correlated sources [5]. Salimi and
Skoglund developed the channel model with correlated sources
in a generalized multiple access channel at which each of the
transmitters intends to agree on an independent private key
with the receiver [6]. In the channel model, assumption of
the channel state information accessibility is more practical
than existence of correlated sources. In such networks, the
channel state information can be utilized to share secret keys.
In [7]-[9], the problem of secret key sharing is studied over
the wiretap channel with non-causal and causal channel state
information.
Consider a network with four types of users, trusted center,
cluster node, end node and illegal user, which have different
levels of accessibility. This network can be divided into sub-
networks that each contains one cluster node and some end
nodes. The trusted center broadcasts data signals to all users,
while control signals are only transmitted to cluster nodes.
The control signals that are sent to each cluster node must be
concealed from the other cluster nodes. In addition, the illegal
users try to eavesdrop both data and control signals. Motivated
by the above scenario, we study the problem of secret key
sharing in state-dependent 3-receiver broadcast channels where
the Channel State Information (CSI) is non-causally available
at the transmitter. We consider two cluster nodes, a trusted
center and an illegal user. Without loss of generality end nodes
are not considered. Two different models are discussed:
• Without Public Feedback: The transmitter intends to agree
on a common key with the legitimate receivers and a
private key with the corresponding receivers.
• With One Round Public Feedback: An insecure public
channel is available among the receivers and the transmit-
ter. Each legitimate receiver wishes to agree on a private
key with the transmitter.
In the first model, an inner bound to the secret key capacity
region is derived where the joint source channel coding is
used. The coding scheme combines the aspects of both source
and channel coding for secret key generation. Also, an outer
bound to the secret key capacity region is obtained. In the
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second model, we establish an inner bound on the secret key
capacity region where the double random binning is employed.
Furthermore, it is shown that the capacity region of the secret
key in the state-dependent wiretap channel can be deduced
from our inner and outer bounds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model is described. In Section III, our main results
and the intuitions behind them are given. Finally, proof of
theorems are illustrated in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Throughout the paper, we denote a discrete random variable
by an upper case letter (e.g., X) and its realization by the lower
case letter (e.g., x). We denote the probability density function
of X over X by pX(x) and the conditional probability density
function of Y given X by pY |X(y|x). Finally, we use Xn to
indicate vector (X1, X2, . . . , Xn).
In order to discuss the problem of secret key agreement over
state-dependent 3-receiver broadcast channels, we consider
a channel model consisting of a transmitter, two legitimate
receivers and an eavesdropper. The transmitter communicates
with the other three users over a 3-receiver broadcast channel.
We assume that the channel is discrete memoryless with an
input alphabet X , output alphabet Y1×Y2×Z depending on
a parameter S with values in a set S.
In the described model, we consider two cases separately;
A. no public feedback is allowed among the transmitter and
the receivers. B. one round public feedback is allowed among
the users.
A. The Model Without Public Feedback
In the model without public feedback, as Fig. 1 illustrates,
the CSI is available at the transmitter. The transmitter, upon
observing sn, generates k0 ∈ [1 : 2nR0) as a common key,
and also, determines two independent keys k1 ∈ [1 : 2nR1)
and k2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2) as private keys for sharing with the first
and second legitimate receivers, respectively. After that, the
transmitter determines the channel input xi as a (potentially
random) function of the keys and sn for i ∈ [1 : n]. Con-
sequently, the outputs yn1 , y
n
2 and z
n are observed by the
receivers. For j = 1, 2, the jth legitimate receivers estimates
the keys kˆ0 and kˆj by means of its observation from the
channel.
Definition 1: A rate triple (R0, R1, R2) is said to be achiev-
able if for every  > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists a
protocol such that
Pr{K0 6= Kˆ0} < , (1)
Pr{K1 6= Kˆ1} <  , Pr{K2 6= Kˆ2} < , (2)
1
n
I(K0,K1,K2;Z
n) < , (3)
1
n
I(K1;Y
n
2 ) < , (4)
1
n
I(K2;Y
n
1 ) < , (5)
1
n
H(Ki) > Ri − , for i = 0, 1, 2. (6)
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Fig. 1. The state-dependent 3-receiver broadcast channel without public
feedback
Equations (1) and (2) are the reliability conditions of the keys.
Equation (3) shows that the eavesdropper can not reconstruct
the keys. Equations (4) and (5) mean that each legitimate
receiver has efficiently no information about the other legiti-
mate receiver’s private key. Finally, the equation (6) imposes
uniformity condition.
Definition 2: The secret key capacity region is the set of
all achievable rate triples (R0, R1, R2).
B. The Model With One Round Public Feedback
This model has some differences with the model discussed
in sub-section II. A. In the current model, the legitimate
receivers use the public feedback channel to transmit the
required information to the transmitter for the key recon-
struction. However, in the model without public channel,
the transmitter transmits the required information via the 3-
receiver broadcast channel to the legitimate receivers.
In the model with one round public feedback, as Fig. 2
illustrates, the CSI is also known non-causally at the trans-
mitter and a public channel is available from the receivers
to the transmitter. The transmitter, upon observing sn, sends
xi for i ∈ [1 : n] over the channel. For j = 1, 2, the
jth legitimate receiver transmits ψj as (potentially random)
function of its observation ynj , using the public feedback
channel. Then, the jth legitimate receiver generates private key
kj ∈ [1 : 2nRj ) as (potentially random) function of ynj , ψ1 and
ψ2. The transmitter determines kˆ1 and kˆ2 as the estimation of
the keys k1 and k2 by means of the received messages from
the public feedback channel and (xn, sn).
Definition 3: A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if
for every  > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists a protocol
such that
Pr{K1 6= Kˆ1} <  , Pr{K2 6= Kˆ2} < , (7)
1
n
I(K1;Y
n
2 , ψ1, ψ2) < , (8)
1
n
I(K2;Y
n
1 , ψ1, ψ2) < , (9)
1
n
I(K1,K2;Z
n, ψ1, ψ2) < , (10)
1
n
H(Ki) > Ri − , for i = 1, 2. (11)
Equation (7) is the reliability conditions of the private keys.
Equations (8) and (9) mean that each legitimate receiver has
efficiently no information about the other legitimate receiver’s
private key. Equation (10) illustrates that the eavesdropper can
not reconstruct the private keys. Finally, the equation (11)
imposes uniformity condition.
Definition 4: The private key capacity region is the set of
all achievable rate pairs (R1, R2).
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state the main results about the described
models. We discuss the cases of without public feedback in
sub-section III. A and with one round public feedback in sub-
section III. B.
A. The Model Without Public Feedback
For the model without public feedback, we establish the
following inner and outer bounds on the secret key capacity
region.
Theorem 1 (Inner Bound): The rate triple (R0, R1, R2) is
achievable for the model without public feedback if:
R0 ≤ [min{I(U0;Y1), I(U0;Y2)} − I(U0;Z)]+,
R1 ≤ [I(U1;Y1|U0)− I(U1;Y2, U2|U0)]+,
R2 ≤ [I(U2;Y2|U0)− I(U2;Y1, U1|U0)]+,
R0 +R1 ≤ [min{I(U0;Y1), I(U0;Y2)},
+ I(U1, Y1|U0)− I(U0, U1;Z)]+,
R0 +R2 ≤ [min{I(U0;Y1), I(U0;Y2)},
+ I(U2, Y2|U0)− I(U0, U2;Z)]+,
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ [min{I(U0;Y1), I(U0;Y2)},
+ I(U1, Y1|U0) + I(U2, Y2|U0),
− I(U0, U1, U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|U0)]+,
subject to the constraints:
I(U0;Y1) ≥ I(U0;S),
I(U0;Y2) ≥ I(U0;S),
I(U1;Y1|U0) ≥ I(U1;S|U0),
I(U2;Y2|U0) ≥ I(U2;S|U0), (12)
for some input distributions:
pS,U0,U1,U2,X,Y1,Y2,Z(s, u0, u1, u2, x, y1, y2, z) =
pS(s)pU0|S(u0|s)pU1|S,U0(u1|s, u0)pU2|S,U0(u2|s, u0)
pX|S,U0,U1,U2(x|s, u0, u1, u2)pY1,Y2,Z|X,S(y1, y2, z|x, s),
where the function [x]+ equals to x if x ≥ 0 and 0 if x < 0.
Proof : See Section IV. A.
For the achievability, we use a scheme which utilizes the
joint source channel coding for two discrete memoryless
sources over the broadcast channel and also, random binning
to satisfy secrecy constrains.
ENC
DEC 1
DEC 2
EVE
Sn
X n
Y 1
n
Y 2
n
Zn
k̂1 , k̂ 2
k1 , H (K 2∣Y 1
n ,ψ1 ,ψ2)
k 2 , H (K 1∣Y 2
n ,ψ1 ,ψ2)
H (K 1 , K2∣Z
n ,ψ1 ,ψ2)
pY 1 ,Y 2 ,Z | X , S
ψ1,ψ2
Public Channel
Fig. 2. The state-dependent 3-receiver broadcast channel with presence of
one round public feedback
Theorem 2 (Outer Bound): For the model without public
feedback, any rate triple (R0, R1, R2) must satisfy
R0 ≤ min{I(X,S;Y1|Z), I(X,S;Y2|Z)},
R1 ≤ min{I(X,S;Y1|Y2), I(X,S;Y1|Z)},
R2 ≤ min{I(X,S;Y2|Y1), I(X,S;Y2|Z)}, (13)
for some input distributions pS,X,Y1,Y2,Z .
Proof : See Section IV. B.
Remark 1: By setting U1 = U2 = ∅ in Theorem 1 and Y1 =
Y2 = Y in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the region reduces to
the region of the secret key in the wiretap channel without
public feedback [7].
B. The Model With One Round Public Feedback
For the model with one round public feedback, we establish
the following inner bound on the private key capacity region.
Theorem 3 (Inner Bound): The rate pair (R1, R2) is
achievable for the model with one round public feedback if:
R1 ≤ [ min{I(X,S;V1)− I(V1;Y2),
I(X,S;V1)− I(V1;Z)}]+
R2 ≤ [ min{I(X,S;V2)− I(V2;Y1),
I(X,S;V2)− I(V2;Z)}]+
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X,S;V1, V2)− I(V1, V2;Z), (14)
for some input distributions:
pS,X,V1,V2,Y1,Y2,Z(s, x, v1, v2, y1, y2, z) = pS(s)pX|S(x|s)
pY1,Y2,Z|X,S(y1, y2, z|x, s)pV1|Y1(v1|y1)pV2|Y2(v2|y2).
Proof : See Section IV. C.
The main idea of achieving the inner bound comes from
the Slepian and Wolf coding scheme for distributed lossless
source coding problems [10]. In addition, we use the double
random binning to satisfy the secrecy constrains.
Remark 2: By setting Y1 = V1 = ∅ and Y2 = V2 = Y (or
Y2 = V2 = ∅ and Y1 = V1 = Y ) in Theorem 3, the inner
bound reduces to the inner bound on the secret key in the
wiretap channel with one round public feedback [8].
IV. PROOFS
In this section, we illustrate the proof of theorems. In order
to prove Theorem 1, the hybrid joint source channel coding
and random binning are used. The innovation behind the proof
of Theorem 3 comes from the Slepian and Wolf coding and
the double random binning.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Fix conditional probability density function pU0,U1,U2|S .
Codebook Generation: Generate 2nR˜0 sequences Un0 (mu0)
mu0 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜0), each according to
∏n
i=1 pU0(u0i). Then,
randomly and independently partition them into 2nR0 bins.
For each mu0 , we generate 2
nR˜1 sequences Un1 (mu1), mu1 ∈
[1 : 2nR˜1) each according to
∏n
i=1 pU1|U0(u1i|u0i), and parti-
tion them into 2nR1 bins. Similarly, for each mu0 , we generate
2nR˜2 sequences Un2 (mu2), mu2 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜2) each according
to
∏n
i=1 pU2|U0(u2i|u0i). At the end, randomly partition the
sequences Un2 into 2
nR2 bins.
Encoding: For each sequence sn, the encoder chooses
a triple (mu0 ,mu1 ,mu2) such that (s
n, un0 (mu0), u
n
1 (mu1),
un2 (mu2)) ∈ T (n) (S,U0, U1, U2). Then, the transmitter
sends xi according to pX|U0,U1,U2,S(xi|u0i, u1i, u2i, si) for
i ∈ [1 : n] over the 3-receiver broadcast channel. By the cov-
ering lemma [11], this can be done with an arbitrarily small
probability of error if:
R˜0 ≥ I(U0;S),
R˜1 ≥ I(U1;S|U0),
R˜2 ≥ I(U2;S|U0). (15)
Decoding: After receiving yn1 , the first legitimate re-
ceiver finds a sequence pair (un0 (mˆu0), u
n
1 (mˆu1)), such
that (un0 (mˆu0), u
n
1 (mˆu1), y
n
1 ) ∈ T (n) (U0, U1, Y1). Similarly,
upon observing yn2 the second legitimate receiver finds a
sequence pair (un0 (mˆu0), u
n
2 (mˆu2)), such that (u
n
0 (mˆu0),
un2 (mˆu2), y
n
2 ) ∈ T (n) (U0, U2, Y2). By the packing lemma
[11], the probability of error tends to zero as n→∞ if:
R˜0 ≤ min{I(U0;Y1), I(U0;Y2)},
R˜1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|U0),
R˜2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|U0). (16)
Secret Key Generation: After decoding, the transmitter and
the legitimate receivers agree on the bin index of un0 to be the
public key k0. The transmitter and the first legitimate receiver
agree on the bin index of un1 as the private key, likewise, the
second legitimate receiver agrees on the bin index of un2 as
the private-key k2 with the transmitter.
Analysis of Secrecy: In order to check the secrecy condition
(3), we have:
I(K0,K1,K2;Z
n|C) = I(K0;Zn|C) + I(K1;Zn|K0, C)
+ I(K2;Z
n|K0,K1, C), (17)
to satisfy the secrecy condition all the above terms must tend
to zero as n→∞, for the first term we have:
I(K0;Z
n|C) = H(K0|C)−H(K0|Zn, C) = H(K0|C)
−H(K0, Un0 |Zn, C) +H(Un0 |K0, Zn, C) = H(K0|C)
−H(Un0 |Zn, C)−H(K0|Un0 , Zn, C) +H(Un0 |K0, Zn, C)
(a)
= H(K0|C)−H(Un0 |Zn, C) +H(Un0 |K0, Zn, C)
(b)
≤ nR0 −H(Un0 |Zn, C) +H(Un0 |K0, Zn, C)
(c)
≤ nR0
− nR˜0 + nI(U0;Z) +H(Un0 |K0, Zn, C)
(d)
≤ nR0 − nR˜0 + nI(U0;Z) + nR˜0 − nR0
− nI(U0;Z) + n = n,
as K0 is the bin index of Un0 , the equality H(K0|Un0 , Zn, C)
= 0 holds which implies (a). (b) comes from the fact that
H(K0|C) ≤ H(K0) ≤ nR0. (c) can be deduced from
inequality H(Un0 |Zn, C) ≥ nR˜0 − nI(U0;Z).
H(Un0 |Zn, C) = H(Un0 , Zn|C)−H(Zn|C) = H(Un0 |C)
+H(Zn|Un0 , C)−H(Zn|C) = nR˜0 +H(Zn|Un0 , C)−H(Zn|C)
= nR˜0 − I(Zn;Un0 |C) ≥ nR˜0 − I(Zn;Un0 , C) = nR˜0
− I(Zn;Un0 ) = nR˜0 − nI(Z;U0),
the inequality H(Un0 |K0, Zn, C) ≤ nR˜0−nR0−nI(U0;Z)+
n is established if R˜0 − R0 ≥ I(U0;Z) +  which implies
(d). The proof is similar to Appendix 22C in [11]. For the
second term of (17),
I(K1;Z
n|K0, C) = H(K1|K0, C)−H(K1|K0, Zn, C)
(a)
≤ nR1
−H(K1, Un1 , Un0 |K0, Zn, C) +H(Un1 , Un0 |K0,K1, Zn, C)
(b)
= nR1 −H(Un1 , Un0 |K0, Zn, C) +H(Un1 , Un0 |K0,K1, Zn, C)
= nR1 −H(Un0 |K0, Zn, C)−H(Un1 |K0, Un0 , Zn, C)
+H(Un1 , U
n
0 |K0,K1, Zn, C)
(c)
≤ nR1 − n(R˜0 −R0) + nI(U0;Z)
− nR˜1 + nI(U1;Z|U0) +H(Un1 , Un0 |K0,K1, Zn, C)
(d)
≤ nR1 − n(R˜0 −R0) + nI(U0;Z)− nR˜1 + nI(U1;Z|U0)
+ n(R˜0 −R0) + n(R˜1 −R1)− nI(U0, U1;Z) + n = n,
where (a) comes from the fact that H(K1|K0, C) ≤ H(K1) ≤
nR1. As K1 is the bin index of Un1 , the equality H(K1|K0,
Un1 , U
n
0 , Z
n, C) = 0 holds, which implies (b). In order to prove
(c), we have:
H(Un0 |K0, Zn, C) = H(Un0 , Zn|K0, C)−H(Zn|K0, C)
= H(Un0 |K0, C) +H(Zn|K0, Un0 , C)−H(Zn|K0, C)
= n(R˜0 −R0)− I(Zn;Un0 |K0, C) ≥ n(R˜0 −R0)
− I(Zn;Un0 ,K0, C) = n(R˜0 −R0)− I(Zn;Un0 )
− I(Zn;K0, C|Un0 ) = n(R˜0 −R0)− I(Zn;Un0 ) = n(R˜0 −R0)
− nI(Z;U0),
and
H(Un1 |K0, Un0 , Zn, C) = H(Un1 , Zn|K0, Un0 , C)
−H(Zn|K0, Un0 , C) = H(Un1 |K0, Un0 , C)
+H(Zn|K0, Un0 , Un1 , C)−H(Zn|K0, Un0 , C)
= nR˜1 − I(Zn;Un1 |K0, Un0 , C) ≥ nR˜1 − I(Zn;Un1 ,K0, C|Un0 )
= nR˜1 − I(Zn;Un1 |Un0 )− I(Zn;K0, C|Un1 , Un0 )
= nR˜1 − I(Zn;Un1 |Un0 ) = nR˜1 − nI(Z;U1|U0),
the inequality H(Un1 , U
n
0 |K0,K1, Zn, C) ≤ n(R˜0 − R0) +
n(R˜1 − R1) − nI(U0, U1;Z) + n is established if (R˜0 −
R0) + (R˜1 − R1) ≥ I(U0, U1;Z) +  which implies (d), the
proof is similar to Appendix 22C in [11]. For the third term
of (17), we have:
I(K2;Z
n|K0,K1, C) = H(K2|K0,K1, C)
−H(K2|K0,K1, Zn, C)
(a)
≤ nR2 −H(K2, Un2 , Un1 , Un0 |K0,K1, Zn, C)
+H(Un2 , U
n
1 , U
n
0 |K0,K1,K2, Zn, C)
(b)
= nR2 −H(Un2 , Un1 , Un0 |K0,K1, Zn, C)
+H(Un2 , U
n
1 , U
n
0 |K0,K1,K2, Zn, C)
= nR2 −H(Un1 , Un0 |K0,K1, Zn, C)
−H(Un2 |K0,K1, Un1 , Un0 , Zn, C)
+H(Un2 , U
n
1 , U
n
0 |K0,K1,K2, Zn, C)
(c)
≤ nR2 − n(R˜0 −R0)
− n(R˜1 −R1) + nI(U1, U0;Z)− nR˜2 + nI(U2;Z,U1|U0)
+H(Un2 , U
n
1 , U
n
0 |K0,K1,K2, Zn, C)
(d)
≤ nR2 − n(R˜0 −R0)
− n(R˜1 −R1) + nI(U1, U0;Z)− nR˜2 + nI(U2;Z,U1|U0)
+ n(R˜0 −R0) + n(R˜1 −R1) + n(R˜2 −R2)− nI(U1, U0;Z)
− nI(U2;Z,U1|U0) + n = n,
where (a) comes from the fact that H(K2|K0,K1, C) ≤
H(K2) ≤ nR2. As K2 is the bin index of Un2 , the equality
H(K2|K0,K1, Un2 , Un1 , Un0 , Zn, C) = 0 holds which implies
(b). In order to prove (c), we have:
H(Un1 , U
n
0 |K0,K1, Zn, C) = H(Un1 , Un0 , Zn|K0,K1, C)
−H(Zn|K0,K1, C) = H(Un1 , Un0 |K0,K1, C)
+H(Zn|K0,K1, Un1 , Un0 , C)−H(Zn|K0,K1, C)
= n(R˜0 −R0) + n(R˜1 −R1)− I(Zn;Un1 , Un0 |K0,K1, C)
≥ n(R˜0 −R0) + n(R˜1 −R1)− I(Zn;Un1 , Un0 ,K0,K1, C)
= n(R˜0 −R0) + n(R˜1 −R1)− I(Zn;Un1 , Un0 )
− I(Zn;K0,K1, C|Un1 , Un0 ) = n(R˜0 −R0) + n(R˜1 −R1)
− I(Zn;Un1 , Un0 ) = n(R˜0 −R0) + n(R˜1 −R1)− nI(Z;U1, U0),
and
H(Un2 |K0,K1, Un1 , Un0 , Zn, C) = H(Un2 , Un1 , Zn,K1|K0, Un0 , C)
−H(Un1 , Zn,K1|K0, Un0 , C) = H(Un2 |K0, Un0 , C)
+H(Un1 , Z
n,K1|K0, Un0 , Un2 , C)−H(Un1 , Zn,K1|K0, Un0 , C)
= nR˜2 − I(Un1 , Zn,K1;Un2 |K0, Un0 , C) = nR˜2
− I(Un1 , Zn;Un2 |K0, Un0 , C)− I(K1;Un2 |K0, Un1 , Un0 , Zn, C)
≥ nR˜2 − I(Un1 , Zn;Un2 ,K0, C|Un0 ) = nR˜2 − I(Un1 , Zn;Un2 |Un0 )
− I(Un1 , Zn;K0, C|Un2 , Un0 ) = nR˜2 − I(Un1 , Zn;Un2 |Un0 )
≥ nR˜2 − nI(U1, Z;U2|U0),
the inequality H(Un2 , U
n
1 , U
n
0 |K0,K1,K2, Zn, C) ≤ n(R˜0 −
R0) + n(R˜1 − R1) + n(R˜2 − R2) − nI(U0, U1;Z) −
nI(U2;Z,U1|U0) + n is established if (R˜0 − R0) + (R˜1 −
R1)+(R˜2−R2) ≥ I(U0, U1;Z)+ I(U2;Z,U1|U0)+  which
implies (d). The proof is similar to Appendix 22C in [11]. By
checking (4) and (5) in similar way, the following conditions
are obtained:
R˜1 −R1 ≥ I(U1;Y2, U2|U0) + ,
R˜2 −R2 ≥ I(U2;Y1, U1|U0) + .
B. Proof of Theorem 2
In our described model, each legitimate receiver must be
able to estimate the common key k0 correctly and according to
the Fano’s inequality 1nH(K0|Y n1 ) ≤  and 1nH(K0|Y n2 ) ≤ ,
and also, the secrecy condition 1nI(K0;Z
n) ≤  must be
satisfied. We find an outer bound on R0. (outer bounds on
R1 and R2 can be obtained similarly)
nR0 = H(K0) = I(K0;Y
n
1 ) +H(K0|Y n1 )
(a)
≤ I(K0;Y n1 ) + n
≤ I(K0;Y n1 , Zn) + n = I(K0;Zn) + I(K0;Y n1 |Zn) + n
(b)
≤ I(K0;Y n1 |Zn) + 2n ≤ I(K0, Xn, Sn;Y n1 |Zn) + 2n
= I(Xn, Sn;Y n1 |Zn) + I(K0;Y n1 |Zn, Xn, Sn) + 2n
(c)
≤ I(Xn, Sn;Y n1 |Zn) + 2n ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Si;Y1i|Zi) + 2n
(d)
= nI(XQ, SQ;Y1Q|ZQ, Q) + 2n ≤ nI(XQ, SQ, Q;Y1Q|ZQ)
+ 2n = nI(XQ, SQ;Y1Q|ZQ) + nI(Q;Y1Q|XQ, SQ, ZQ)
+ 2n
(e)
= nI(XQ, SQ;Y1Q|ZQ) + 2n,
where (a) and (b) comes from the Fano’s inequality and the
secrecy condition, respectively. (c) can be deduced from the
Markov chain K0 → (Xn, Sn) → (Y n1 , Y n2 , Zn) and (d) can
be obtained by defining Q as a uniform random variable over
[1 : n]. The Markov chain Q→ (SQ, XQ)→ Y1Q implies (e).
Also in a similar way, we have R0 ≤ I(X,S;Y2|Z). Finally,
R0 ≤ min{I(X,S;Y1|Z), I(X,S;Y2|Z)}.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Fix probability distributions pV1 and pV2 .
Codebook Generation: Consider the set of all typi-
cal sequences V n1 and V
n
2 with probability distribution∏n
i=1 pV1(v1i) and
∏n
i=1 pV2(v2i). The number of sequences
vn1 and v
n
2 are 2
n(H(V1)+1) and 2n(H(V2)+2), respectively,
where 1, 2 > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small. For j = 1, 2,
partition sequences vnj into 2
nR′j bins and each bin into 2nRj
sub-bins, using double random binning. Therefore, in average,
there are 2n(H(Vj)−R
′
j+j) and 2n(H(Vj)−R
′
j−Rj+j) sequences
vnj in each bin and sub-bin, respectively.
Encoding: Upon observing sn, the transmitter randomly
and independently generates a codeword xn according to
the conditional distribution
∏n
i=1
pX|S(xi|si), and transmits xi
for i ∈ [1 : n] over the 3-receiver broadcast channel with the
channel probability distribution pY1,Y2,Z|X,S .
Use of The Public Channel: On the basis of channel output
sequence yn1 the first legitimate receiver finds v
n
1 such that
(vn1 , y
n
1 ) ∈ T (n)(V1, Y1) and sends the bin index of vn1 via
the public channel. Similarly, the second legitimate receiver
finds the bin index of vn2 such that (v
n
2 , y
n
2 ) ∈ T (n)(V2, Y2)
and transmits the bin index of vn2 over the public channel.
Secret Key Generation: The transmitter upon receiving the
bin indices of vn1 and v
n
2 from the public channel and by the
knowledge of xn and sn can recover vn1 and v
n
2 . Then both
transmitter and the first legitimate receiver agree on the sub-bin
index of vn1 as the private key. Similarly, the second legitimate
receiver and the transmitter agree on the sub-bin index of vn2
as their private key.
Analysis of The Probability of Error: From the Slepian and
Wolf theorem, the probability of error tends to zero as n→∞
if:
R′1 ≥ H(V1|X,S), R′2 ≥ H(V2|X,S),
R′1 +R
′
2 ≥ H(V1, V2|X,S). (18)
Analysis of Secrecy: We will prove that the following
constraints are sufficient to satisfy the secrecy condition (10).
R1 +R
′
1 ≤ H(V1|Z), R2 +R′2 ≤ H(V2|Z),
R′1 +R
′
2 +R1 +R2 ≤ H(V1, V2|Z). (19)
In order to prove (19), we have:
I(K1,K2;Z
n, ψ1, ψ2|C) = I(K1;Zn, ψ1|C) + I(K1;ψ2|Zn, ψ1, C)
+ I(K2;Z
n, ψ1, ψ2|K1, C). (20)
For the first term we have:
I(K1;Z
n, ψ1|C) = I(K1, V n1 ;Zn, ψ1|C)− I(V n1 ;Zn, ψ1|K1, C)
(a)
= I(V n1 ;Z
n, ψ1|C)−H(V n1 |K1, C) +H(V n1 |Zn, ψ1,K1, C)
= H(V n1 |C)−H(V n1 |Zn, ψ1, C)−H(V n1 |K1, C)
+H(V n1 |Zn, ψ1,K1, C),
as K2 is the sub-bin index of V n1 the equality I(K1;Z
n,
ψ1|V n1 , C) = 0 holds, which implies (a). Now
H(V n1 |Zn, ψ1, C) = H(V n1 |Zn) +H(ψ1|Zn, V n1 , C)
−H(ψ1|Zn, C) (b)= H(V n1 |Zn)−H(ψ1|Zn, C)
≥ H(V n1 |Zn)− nR′1 = n(H(V1|Z)−R′1),
where (b) comes from the fact that ψ1 is the bin index of V n1 ,
H(V n1 |K1, C) = H(V n1 ) +H(K1|V n1 , C)−H(K1|C) (c)= H(V n1 )
−H(K1|C) ≥ n(H(V1)−R1),
where (c) comes from the fact that K1 is the sub-bin index
of V n1 , by substituting, we have
I(K1;Z
n, ψ1|C) ≤ n(R′1 +R1 −H(V1|Z))
+H(V n1 |Zn, ψ1,K1, C)
(d)
≤ nR′1 + nR1 − nH(V1|Z) + nH(V1|Z)
− nR′1 − nR1 + n = n,
where (d) follows by Lemma 22.3 in [11] at which
H(V n1 |Zn, ψ1, K1, C) ≤ nH(V1|Z) − nR′1 − nR1 + n, if
R′1 +R1 ≤ H(V1|Z) + . For the second term of (20),
I(K1;ψ2|ψ1, Zn, C) = I(K1,K2, V n1 , V n2 ;ψ2|ψ1, Zn, C)
− I(V n1 , V n2 ,K2;ψ2|K1, ψ1, Zn, C) (a)= I(V n1 , V n2 ;ψ2|ψ1, Zn, C)
− I(K2;ψ2|K1, ψ1, Zn, C)− I(V n1 , V n2 ;ψ2|K1,K2, ψ1, Zn, C)
= I(V n1 , V
n
2 ;K1,K2|ψ1, Zn, C)−H(V n1 , V n2 |ψ1, ψ2, Zn, C)
+H(V n1 , V
n
2 |K1,K2, ψ1, ψ2, Zn, C) +H(K2|K1, ψ1, ψ2, Zn, C)
−H(K2|K1, ψ1, Zn, C)
(b)
≤ nR1 + nR2 − nH(V1, V2|Z) + nR′1
+ nR′2 + nH(V1, V2|Z)− nR′1 − nR1 − nR′2 − nR2 + n = n,
K1 and K2 are the sub-bin indices of V n1 and V
n
2 the equality
I(K1,K2;ψ2|ψ1, V n1 , V n2 , Zn, C) = 0 holds which implies
(a). (b) can be deduced from Lemma 22.3 in [11]. Finally,
for the third term of (20) we have:
I(K2;Z
n, ψ1, ψ2|K1, C) = I(K2, V n1 , V n2 ;Zn, ψ1, ψ2|K1, C)
− I(V n1 , V n2 ;Zn, ψ1, ψ2|K1,K2, C)
(a)
= I(V n1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n, ψ1, ψ2|K1, C)
− I(V n1 , V n2 ;Zn, ψ1, ψ2|K1,K2, C)
= H(V n1 , V
n
2 |K1, C)−H(V n1 , V n2 |K1, ψ1, ψ2, Zn, C)
−H(V n1 , V n2 |K1,K2, C) +H(V n1 , V n2 |K1,K2, ψ1, ψ2, Zn, C)
(b)
= H(K2|K1, C)−H(V n1 , V n2 |K1, ψ1, ψ2, Zn, C)
+H(V n1 , V
n
2 |K1,K2, ψ1, ψ2, Zn, C),
as K2 is the sub-bin index of V n2 the equality I(K2;Z
n, ψ1,
ψ2|K1, V n1 , V n2 , C) = 0 holds which implies (a). (b) comes
from the fact that I(V n1 , V
n
2 ;K2|K1, C) = H(K2|K1, C). Now
H(V n1 , V
n
2 |K1, ψ1, ψ2, Zn, C) = H(V n1 , V n2 ,K1, ψ1, ψ2|Zn, C)
−H(K1, ψ1, ψ2|Zn, C) (c)= H(V n1 , V n2 |Zn, C)
−H(K1, ψ1, ψ2|Zn, C) ≥ H(V n1 , V n2 |Zn, C)− n(R′1 +R′2 +R1)
= nH(V1, V2|Z)− n(R′1 +R′2 +R1),
as K1 is the sub-bin index of V n1 and also, ψ1 and ψ2
are the bin indices of V n1 and V
n
2 , respectively, the equality
H(K1, ψ1, ψ2|V n1 , V n2 , Zn, C) = 0 holds which implies (c).
Using Lemma 22.3 in [11], we have H(V n1 , V
n
2 |K1,K2,
ψ1, ψ2, Z
n, C) ≤ nH(V1, V2)− nR′1 − nR1 − nR′2 − nR2 −
nI(V1, V2;Z)+n if R′1+R
′
2+R1+R2 ≤ H(V1, V2|Z)+ .
Finally, by substituting we have I(K2;Zn, ψ1, ψ2|K1C) ≤ n.
Similarly, we can prove that the following constraints satisfy
the secrecy conditions (8) and (9):
R1 +R
′
1 ≤ H(V1|V2, Y2),
R1 +R
′
1 ≤ H(V2|V1, Y1). (21)
Collecting terms of (18), (19) and (21), and using Fourier-
Motzkin elimination, we get the expressions (14).
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